Any historical and critical appreciation of Hegel's basic thesis of the identity of metaphysics with logic cannot fail to compare it with his charging Kant and Fichte with attaching a merely subjective meaning to logical determinations, as well as Schelling with spinozism and extrinsicalness in conceiving the absolute indifference of subject with object. This paper aims to give an account of Hegel's notion of nature as it arises from the fulfillment of the logical idea (as the Anderssein of the idea (...) in which it is in the form of the alienation (Entaeusserung)) by focussing attention on the logical pathway of the notion of externality (Aeusserlichkeit) in the Doctrine of Being. I argue for an alternative to the received view on the outcome of the Logic of Being, by pointing out two different meanings, overlooked so far, attached to the category of measure vs. the notion of Mode and to Spinoza's substance in 1812 and 1832. (shrink)

Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century current historiography doesn't seem to offer a satisfactory reconstruction of medieval terminism, so as to be able to solve the problems of interpretation regarding to the notion of ‘intensio’. In order to analyse appropriately the relationship between the notion of ‘intensio’ and the mathematical representation of its ‘latitudo’, a thorough examination of the semantic nature of the notions of intensive qualities and of their logical behaviour is here attempted.

Volume I. Dall'Antica Grecia al Classicismo -- Volume II. Dal Romanticismo alla contemporaneità.

PART I The first chapter contains some arguments in favour of four general requirements on a theory of meaning which Michael Dummett has formulated: connection between meaning and understanding, distinction between sense and force, compositionality, and manifestability. The second chapter contains a condensed account of the theory of meaning centered on bivalent truth-conditions, and a detailed analysis of Dummett's argument against such a theory and against classical logic. The third chapter is a description of Dummett's theory of meaning centered on (...) the notion of direct verification, and of Prawitz's semantics which can be embedded in the latter theory of meaning so as to justify intuitionistic logic. The weakest points of Dummett's idea are two: 1) it is difficult to make verificationism compatible with the holistic character of justification; 2) logical revisionism may involve a too drastic disagreement between verificationism and linguistic practice. -/- PART II. The second part contains a presentation of a theory of meaning centered on the notion which I have called immediate argumental role. The fundamental idea of the theory is that the sense of a word is given by all the argumentation rules concerning the word. Chapters IV-VII make precise the basic idea by explaining the notion of "argumentation rule" and by defining the notion of "concerning", and other notions among which "immediate argumental role of a sentence" and "global argumental role". Chapters VIII-X deal with the main philosophical features of the theory: 1) the theory satisfies the four requirements considered in the first chapter; 2) despite its compositionality, the theory is compatible with epistemological holism; 3) the theory admits the possibility of meaningful paradoxical languages; 4) the theory distinguishes between the understandability of a language and its correctness in a given epistemic situation (understandability does not imply correctness); 5) the theory is pluralist with respect to the understandability of different logics and neutral with respect to their validity. (shrink)

Philosophy is often taken to be something that is always possible, so that everyone is fully entitled sketching a ‘philosophy’ of his/her own. Nevertheless, it is widely assumed that philosophy began in Miletus with Thales. But it is equally well known that the Presocratics remained unaware of being philosophers, and therefore could not even have wanted to be identified that way. These three points are not mutually compatible. So, what lies behind them? What is escaping our attention when we state (...) them? Probably an event in Plato’s life that has too often gone unnoticed: the key role he played in giving form and substance to philosophy, and in getting it to take root once and for all. Failure to acknowledge how, when, and on whose initiative philosophy came to occupy a very important place in Western culture and education for two and a half millennia; not including a note on this process in biographies of Plato; and overlooking another key event that probably occurred about 350-45 BC - these are just some of the unwelcome effects linked to the usual silence about the period in which philosophy took form. (shrink)

Jacopo Zabarella’s Opera Logica was published in Venice in 1578. It immediately gave rise to widespread discussion and argument before becoming a highly popular work not only in Italy but also, and above all, in central and northern Europe, in particular in the «reformed» Protestant universities. This essay is the first in a research into the doctrine of logic in Paduan philosophy, which has already rise to another, already published, study. It is the author’s intention to develop the latter (...) further, but in the meantime the theme discussed here is the «genus» of logic in question. It is a fundamental theme that Zabarella was the first to tackle. He began by asserting that the «definition of the thing» was so obscure that many men of letters, philosophers and logicians had ignored it. The very reason why he proposed to study the «proximate genus » of logic, which can be ascertained by examining the various forms of knowledge. This revealed the existence of five intellectual «habits»: science, prudence, art, intellect and erudition. Analysis of the «habits» and then the «concepts» and «names» enabled him to establish that logic was neither a «science» nor an «art» and certainly could not be confused with «dialectics». Its true nature, in fact, was that of an «instrument of science». This entailed acknowledging its «independence», though one conditioned by the Aristotelian distinction between the world of necessary and immutable «things» and that of human action and endeavour. (shrink)

Il testo affronta, alla luce delle più recenti pubblicazioni, il tema del rapporto storia e natura in Hegel; e offre una sintesi del corso di Filosofia della storia tenuto da Russo A. nel corrente anno accademico.

«È ancora necessario, oggi in Italia, sforzarsi di sottolineare l’importanza e l’attualità del pensiero di Jan Patočka?» – si chiede Mauro Carbone presentando questo volume.

Nei Princìpi della filosofia dell'avvenire (1843) Feuerbach ricostruisce la genealogia dell'idealismo, mostrando il legame tra teologia e forme filosofiche sostenuto già nelle Tesi provvisorie per una riforma della filosofia. Tuttavia non si ferma ad una lettura, pur geniale, della storia della filosofia, ma prospetta una nuova soluzione del problema ontologico che eviti il vuoto di soggetto in cui incorre la logica di Hegel: l'essere non è solo pensato ma esperito come altro (...) rispetto al pensiero.Feuerbach propone una nozione positiva della sensibilità, uno sguardo rinnovato che pone la causa del desiderio umano nel campo del visibile. Andare oltre Hegel non significa infatti recuperare il concetto romantico di sentimento, ma riconoscere la positività del reale.Nei Princìpi Feuerbach si interroga sugli effetti a lungo termine della verità. Il destinatario di questo manifesto filosofico non è l'uditorio universitario ma l'umanità futura. Qui l'universalità emerge come piano dell'intersoggettività. Solo dopo aver destituito l'Assoluto come soggetto, l'uomo incontra l'altro come simile: finito nella sua esistenza corporea, ma infinito nel genere in quanto umanità. (shrink)